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Abstract
Within a standard model of monetary delegation we show Lhat an optimal
linear inflation contract performs strictly better than an optimal infiation target
whcn there is uncertainty about thc central banker's preferences. The optimal
combination of a contract and a target performs best and eliminates the infla-
tion bias and any variability not associated with economic shocks. However,
the variability due to such shocks is enhanced by the uncertain central banker
preferences and this may or may not dominate thc advantages of delegation.
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Reform of munetary institutions is high on the agenda of both pulicymakers and
researchers. The most prumising propusals for reform are the implementation of per-
f~rmance contracts fur central bankers (as explored in Walsh [1995a] and Persson and
Tabellini [1993]) and the implementatiun of inflation targets (see Svensson [1996]).
Both arrangements involve the delegation of monetary policy to a central bank which
has "instrument independence" (i.e., which is free to choose policy without inference
by the government). However, while under a contract the central bank is also granted
"goal independence" (i.e., is free to determine the policy goals), this is not the case
under a target regime.l
Svensson [1996] shows that (in the absence of output persistence) the optimal infla-
tiun target and the optimal linear inflation contract both lead tu the same equilibrium
and, hence, to equal welfare losses. In partici~lar, if optimally implemented, either
type of arrangement can eliminate the traditional inflation bias as well as ensure effli-
cient stabilization of macrueconomic shocks. This makes both types of arrangements
superior to Ruguff's [1985] widely-discussed suggestion to delegate monetary policy tu
a"conservative" central banker, i.e., a central banker who attaches a larger relative
weight to luw and stable inflation than society does. Such an arrangement would re-
duce the inflation bias at the cust, however, of less efficient stabilization in the presence
uf supply-side shocks.Z
We shuw in this paper that the equivalence between a r.untract and a target breaks
duwn when there is uncertainty about the central banker's preferences over output and
inflation. Intuitively, when the government is risk-averse, uncertainty about the central
banker's preferences may affect the choice of optimal delegation and the desirability of
different delegation forms.3 Uncertainty about the central banker's preferences plays
an important role in practice, as argued in, for example, Havrilesky [1991] (see also the
discussions in, e.g., Backus and Driffill [1985], Cukierman and Meltzer [1986], Vickers
~See, e.g., I'ischer (1995] for a discussion of the two types of indcpendence. Note that these
proposals (as wcll aw our paper) focus on thestructure ofoptimal monetary institutions. The credible
implementation of such institutions is, however, still very much an open question (see McCallum
[]995]) which wc do not address here.
2HerrendorF and Lockwood [1996] demonstrate that in the case where wage setters receive prior
(private) information about a future supply shock, some degrce of "Rogoff-conservativeness " is
still needed a.9 a part of the optimal monetary institution (see also Canwneri et al. [1996]). As a
byproduct of their analysis, they confirm Svensson's [1996] equivalence result.
3Given that monetary delegation is often interpreted as an agreement between a principal (the
government) and an agent (the central bank), pre-contractual asymmetry of information constitutes
a non-trivial frictáon in the principal-agent relationship, and should in general be e~cpected to reduce
the principal's gains from the arrangement (Sappington [1991], Laffont and Tirole [1993]). This is
also the case in our model, as will be seen below.
2[1986] and Cukierman [1996]).
It turns out that the uptimal linear inflation contract performs strictly better than
the optimal inflation target. The reason is that the optimal linear inflation contract
helps to stabilise output and inflation fluctuations resiilting from the uncertainty about
the central banker's preferences, while the optimal inflation target only affects the
performance in terms of average inflation. In particular, the optimal target cannot
affect the additional variability in inflation and output that is attributable to uncertain
preferences.
The solirtion for the uptimal linear contract is of interest in itself. In particular, it is
uptimal to offer a contract in which the additiunal marginal punishment for inflation is
increasing in the degree of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences. As such,
the optimal contract violates the certainty-eq~,ivalence property often encountered in
the literati,re. This is not surprising given the classic results by Brainard [1967], who
showed that the optimal policy choices are affected by uncertainty in the transmission
frum instrument to target variable.
Althuugh the optimal linear contract uutperforms the optimal target, none uf the
two arrangements is able to eliminate al] the variability that is not associated with
economic shucks. We show, however, that any such variability is eliminated under the
uptimal cotnbination uf a contract and a target. This combination slrir,tly outperfurms
either type uf arrangement when implemented in isulation. Moreover, while the opti-
mal inHation target derived Ly Svensson [1996] is below the socially optimal inflation
rate - a result which does nut seem to be in accordance with what we ubserve in prac-
tice - our optimal combination arrangement is characterised by an inflation target
which exceeds the socially optimal inflation rate. Our combinatiun arrangement might
well capture the most important features of New Zealand's monetary arrangements.4
These are characterised by a combination of an inflation target and a dismissal rule
fur the central banker. Indeed, the additional penalty imposed thtough the contract
could be interpreted as the utility loss from dismissal.
Finally, welfare lusses under the uptimal combination arrangement are compared
with the case where munetary policy is selected by the government itself rather than
bv the central bank. In deciding whether or nut to delegate, a trade-off arises between
t.he eliminatiun of the inflation bias and the additiunal variability in the outcomes due
tu supply shocks that arises from uncertain central banker preferences. Delegation is
preferred when the imcertainty about the central banker's preferences and the variance
uf the supply shocks are not too large, when the output target is rather ambitious and
when the government's weight attached to output is relatively high.5
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the model. To facilitate
4Sce Walsh [1995b] for a detailed account o[ these arrangements.
'Alesina and Gatti [1995] present a model with uncertainty about the prefcrences of the govern-
ment rather than the central benk. Introducing political uncertainty leads to the opposite conclusion
that delegation becomes more attractive. The relative importance of political uncertainty and un-
certainty about centrsl banker preferences is of courx an empirical matter.
3futnre comparisons, we derive the outcomes under pre-commitment and discretion in
the absence of delegatiun. Section 3 derives the optimal linear inflation contract and
characterises the equilibrium. Section 4 does the same for the uptimal inflation target.
Welfare losses under ear.h uf the two arrangements are compared in Section 5. Section 6
studies the uptimal cumbinatiun of a cuntract and a target, while Section 7 studies the
desirability of monetary pulicy delegation. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
The Appendix derives a state-contingent. cuntract which yields the pre-commitment
equilibrium.
2. The Model
The basics uf the model is adapted frum Svensson [1996]. For illustrative purposes, it is
kept as simple as possible. Numinal wages within the single period under consideration
are contractually fixed before munetary policy is conducted. Therefore, the lug of
output, ~, is given by the conventional Lucas supply function:
y-~r-E[~r]-e, (2.1)
where ~r and E[n] are actual and (rationally) expected inflation, respectively, and e is a
supply shuck with E[c] - 0 and E[c2] - a?. Given these distributional characteristics
it follows that the natural rate of uutput in the model - by cunvenient nurmalization
- is zero (in lugs). The welfare luss of the government (and of society) is given as
Lc" - 2 ~a (TJ - y)2 -F (~r - ~r)2, ~ J ) 0, ~ 1 0, (2.2)
where y and ~r, respectively, denote the guvernment's target values fur output and
inflatiun.
2.1. No Delegation of Monetary Policy
Monetary policy invulves the choice of the inflation rate, which is assumed to be under
direct contrul uf the authority who is in charge of monetary policy. For the moment
assirme that monetary policy is not delegated to an independent central banker, but
rather chusen directly by the government.
Pre-commitment:
Our benchmark solution is attained when the government is able to commit ex
ante to some inflatiun rate. This is the equilibrium which yields the lowest welfare
luss. It amuunts to the uptimal state-contingent rule and is derived by minimising the
expected valtie of (2.2) subject to (2.1) and the restriction that ~r - E[~r]. The sulution
is characterised by the folluwing expressions for, respectively, expected inflation, the
4variances of inflation and output, and the guvernment's welfare loss:e
~z
E[n] - ~, ~n - za2,
(1 f a)
~G - 2~z}2(lfa)~?.
oz - 1 z
v (1-1-~)za`~
Discretion:
The problem with the pre-cummitment equilibrium is that it is time inconsistent
(e.g., Kydland and Prescott [1977]; Barro and Gordon [1983]). Once nominal wages
have been set, the government has the incentive to raise the inflation rate in urder to
stimulate output. Therefore, it is more realistic to assume, as we will do from nuw on,
that the monetary policymaker is not able to bind itself to its announcements.
The discretionary equilibrium in the absence of delegation is found by minimising
(2.2) sub,ject tu (2.1), taking inflatiun expectations, E[~r], as given. This yields:
z ~
E[~r] - ~r f ay~ an - (1 ~- a)z~" av -(1 f~)za?'
~ a(1 -~ a)-z ~ z (2.4)
L - 2 y }2(lf-a)vE.
Expected inflation exceeds the socially optimal inflation rate by ay because of the
incentive to create a surprise inflation in order to bring output closer to its target,
y 1 0. Clearly, the welfare loss is higher under discretion than under pre-commitment.
Hence, the government may seek to improve upon (2.4) by delegating monetary policy
tu an independent central banker.
2.2. Delegation of Monetary Policy
Fur the remainder of the paper we assume that monetary policy is delegated to a cen-
tral banker with full instrument independence. However, in contrast to the existing
literature, its preferences are urLCertnin at the moment of delegation. This uncertainty
is modelled fullowing Srensen [1991] and is "pure" in two respects: (i) the central
banker's preferences will on average coincide with society's preferences, and (ii) mon-
etar,y policy will on average (for given delegation parameters) coincide with policy in
the absence uf uncertainty abuut the central banker's preferences. More specifically,
we assume that the central bank has the following loss function:
L~II - 2 [(a - a) (J - J)z -~ (1 f ~) (n - ~r)z] , (2.5)
sGiven that expected output is zero independent of the monetary regime, we will neither here,
nor in thc following, state expected output.
5where a is a stochastic parameter unobserved by the government and the private
sectur. We assume that E[a] - 0 and E[az] - aá. Moreover, it is assumed that a is
independent of e, hence E[ac] - 0, and that -1 G a G~ with probability one.
Specification (2.5) may be motivated by the assttmption that the distribution of
preferences ufindividuals in society is determined by a according to (2.5). An (equally-
weighted) aggregatiun uf individuals' preferences over a then yields the welfare loss
function (2.2). Monetary policy can thus be thuught of as being delegated tu an
individual who is randomly selected from suciety. Specification (2.5) has the appealing
property that inflation expectatiuns for any given monetary regime are independent of
a~ , as we will see below. This allows us to derive clused-form solutiuns for the model
and ensures that any effects uf cra will be due to the risk-aversion of the government
unly.7
The timing of events becomes as fulluws: First, monetary pulicy is delegated to
the central bank. Then, infíatiun expectatiuns are furmed. Next, the supply shuck,
c, hits the econumy and, finally, munetary policy is conducted. We will consider two
forms of delegation: A(non-state-contingent) linear inHation cuntract in the sense of
Walsh [1995a] and Persson and Tabellini [1993], and an inflatiun target in the sense
of Svensson [1996].
3. The optimal linear inflation contract
Under a linear inflatiun contract, the central bank incurs an additional penalty if the
inflatiun rate exceeds the socially desired infiation rate ~r. The central banker therefore
faces the fullowing loss function:
L~B ~- J (~r - ir) , (3.1)
where J is the size uf the penalty fur each unit that inflation is above its social
optimum. Parameter J thus characterises the contract.
Under t.his contract, the discretionary central bank chooses inflatiun so as to min-
imise (3.1) subject tu (2.1), having observed the shuck and taking as given inflation






~'fhis is in sharp contrast to the papers of Nolan and Schaling [1996], who allow for a central
banker whose wcight on inflation stabilisation 49 uncertain and who examine the implications for
expected inflation, and I,a9sani, Natale and Tirclli [1996], who use thc same modeling strategy
within a Lohmann [1992] typc of model. Apart (rom the fact that the focus of their analyses is very
diKerent from ours, we note that the way uncertainty is incorporated in their models implies that
average policy outcomes differ (rom Lhose prevailing in the absence of ccntral banker uncertainty.
1nFlation expectations thus res9pond to uncertainty even though the private sector is risk neutral. In
consequence, central bank uncertainty affects both the first and the second moment of inflation. 'Ihc
interpretation of welfare los9cs from such uncertainty is therefore problematic, as sume of the loases
are due to the government's risk aversion and others not. This oonfusion is avoidod in our set up.
6Inflation increases with E[n], y and e, because each uf these variables raises the mar-
ginal gain uf higher uutput (remember that a- a 1 0 for all a), while it decreases
with f, because an increase in f raises the central banker's marginal loss of inflation.
Inflation expectations follow from (3.2) as
E [~r] - ~r ~- aj - J'. (3.3)
Hence, inflatiun is expected tu exceed its sucial optimum whenever ~j ~ f, in which
case the traditional inflatiun bias duminates the disciplining effect of the contract. Also
nute that uncertainty about the central banker's preferences dces not affect inflation
expectations.
Insert (3.3) back into (3.2) in order tu write realised inflation as:
rr-E[~r]-a(J-
1f~fl } lf~c.
Cumbining (3.4) with (2.1) and (3.3) yields realised output:
J--a(J- 1fafJ- 1f~E~
(3.5)
Inflation and uutput deviate from their expected values when either a or e differ from
their expected values of zero.
For the moment, suppose that the supply shock is zero. We see that the contract
affects the extent to which a preference shock is translated into an inflation surprise.
To understand the intuition for this effect, consider the case of a~ 0, i.e., the central
banker turns uut to be more "conservative" than expected. In the absence of a contract
(i.e., f- 0), infiatiun and output will be lower than expected. Equation (3.2) shows
that inflation expectatiuns have a positive effect on actual inflation because of the
need to protect output. However, the incentive to raise inflation in response to higher
expected inflation is weakened if a~ 0. Suppose now that a contract is in place (f~
0). As this reduces inflatiun expectations, it reduces the "inflation-lowering" effect of
an unexpectedly conservative central banker (i.e., a~ 0). For "mild" contracts though
(p G f G(1 f~)y), realised inflation will still be beluw expected inflation when a~ 0.
But for "strict" contracts (f ~(1 -} a)y), the "inflation-lowering" effect is reversed
such that inflation will be unexpectedly high, cf. (3.4) and (3.5). The reason is that a
"strict" contract lowers inflation expectatiuns by so much that output is perceived as
being tou high. As a result, the central bank has the incentive to reduce inflation. If
it c,ares less about output than expected (a ~ 0), it therefore reduces inflation by less
than expected, i.e., it enacts an inflation surprise. Note that for a given realisation of
cx, it folluws that if f-(1 -~ a) j, a preference shock creates no inf}ation surprise at
all.
Now, consider the effects of a supply shock. The transmission of this shock to
inflation and uutput is influenced by the preference shock. A positive realisation of
7a, fur example, increases t.he rehtctance uf the central banker to use inflation as an
ínstntment. fur stabilising uut.pnt. Hence, if a is larger, the effect of a given supply
shuck on ínHatiun becumes weaker, while the effect on uutput becomes strunger. Nute
that the inflatiun contract has nu effect, however, on the interaction between a and e,
as it is unable tu affect the way in which a shock is transmitted into monetary policy,
cf. (3.2).
Because the government is risk averse, it may be instructive to state the variances
uf inflatiun and output fur a given contract. Using (3.4) and (3.5) together with the
assumption that a and e are independent, one has:
( 1 lz ~z f aá z (3.6)
ax - aa `J - 1 -~ .`fI } (1 -4- a)za"
1 z 1 -~ Qz
~~ - `r" ly - 1 ~ ~f I } (1 -1- a)za?~
(3.7)
Hence, thruugh the first term un the right hand sides un (3.6) and (3.7) the cuntract
affects the variation in inflatiun and output arising from uncertain preferences. Be-
cause in absence uf supply shocks both inflation and uutput surprises disappear when
j' - (1 ~- a) j, a contract with this value fur f will minimise the variances of both
inflatiun and output.
The guvernment's ubjective, however, is not to minimise the variance of output
and inflation, but to minimise the expected value of its loss function. Therefore, the
government chuoses f so as to minimise G[I,"] subject to (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5). Using
the first-urder conditiun, the uptimal value for f, denoted by f', is given by:
f~ (1 f a) (~ f ~á)~. (3.8)
lfafaá
Insert (3.8) into (3.4) and (3.5), and use the resulting expressions for realised infla-
t.iun and output to obtain the following characterisation of the equilibrium under the
optimal contract:
z ?z ~z ~- Qz
E[~] -~- 1 f- a-F aáy' a~ - (1 f a-F aá)zJz } (1 f~)zaz
z- an z I } a~ 2 (3.9)
~r - (l f a -~ an)zJ } (l ~ a)za` ~
C (1 f it) (i~ -~ Qa)-'l ~ f Qa 2
T - 2(If~f~~) y }z(Ifa)~~.
Expressiun (3.8) reveals t.hat it is optimal tu offer a cuntract to the central banker which
depends on the degree of uncertainty abuut its preferences. To understand this result,
cunsider the case where aá ~ 0, so that f' -~j. This yields Walsh's [1995a] result
that a contract should be offered that eliminates the expected inflation bias (aj) arising
8frum discretion [see (3.9) for áQ --~ 0], while preserving efficient stabilisatiun of supply
shucks. Hence, the optimal contract, pruduces the uutcomes of the pre-commitment
eqirilibrinm [cumpare (3.9) wit.h (2.:3) fur n~ -. 0]. Huwever, when ~,~, 1 0, une has
t.hat j' ~~j. The reasun is that., Uy raising j abuve aj, the guvernment is able
tu reduce sume of the inflation and output variability arising from uncertain central
Lanker preferences [see (3.6) and (3.7)]. Although expected inflation is reduced to
Uelow its target, the associated luss is of a second-order magnitude, whereas the gain
in terms of lower macrueconomic variaLility is of a first-order magnitude. A higher
variance of a therefore requires a higher value for f'. Note also that if aQ becomes
imbounded, the gains frum reducing macroeconumic variability become so large that
~' approaches (1 -h a) y, the value that minimises the variances ofinflation and output,
as discussed above.s
The way in which the optimal policy chuice of the government depends on uncer-
tainty is analogous tu Brainard's [1967] early results on policymaking in an uncertain
environment. He found that uncertainty aboirt the effects of pulicy variables on tar-
get variables implies that policy choices affect the shape of the distributions of the
target variables. Clearly, a risk-averse government must take this into account when
making its uptimal pulicy choices. Indeed, the same problem arises in selecting the
optimal contract, because the effects of the instrument j on the governments targets
are uncertain, as is clear from (3.4) and (3.5).
Brainard also showed that the optimal policy is independent of uncertainty when
transmission frum policy instruments to target variables is deterministic. The reason is
that the pulicy choice only shifts the locations of the target variables' distributions -
but not their shape. This is alsu reflected in the optimal inflation contract considered
here, which is independent of the variance of the supply shock, even though the uncer-
tainty about the central banker's preferences magnifies the macroeconomic variability
due tu siipply shocks. However, as is clear from (3.6) and (3.7), the transmission from
the supply shucks to the target variables is unaffected by the government's choice of
J.
4. The optimal inflation target
Having characterised the optimal inflation contract, we turn now to the case where
delegation takes the form of imposing an inflation target. The central bank is no
lunger goal independent as the government chooses a particular inflation target, ~rb,
t.u be pursued by the central bank. Its luss function therefore becomes:
z
IGB~-~f(a-a)(y-J)zf(lfa)~~r-rrb) (4.1)
Allsing (3 8), one ha5 that limloé ~.a, J' -(1 -{- ~) J2. Note, however, that the argumcnt is purely
1II119LCRL1Ve, bec;RUSe aá -a oo could Ue inconsistent with the requirement that -1 G o G a for all ct.
9The central bank chouses inflatiun so as tu minimise (4.1) subject tu (2.1), having utr
served the shock and taking as given inflatiun expectations. The first-order condition
implies the fullowing reaction fimctiun:
~- 1-f- a(E [~]
f j-I- E) } 1 f
a~rb. (4.2)
Hence, expected inflation is given by:
E[~r] - zrb f aj. (4.3)
Expected inflatiun is the sum uf the inflation target imposed Ly the government and
the inflation bias arising from discretion in monetary policymaking. Realised inflation
under a given target folluws upun inserting (4.3) back into (4.2):
r-E[~r]-ajf1}~E- (4.4)
Combining (2.1), (4.3) and (4.4) yields:
1 ~- a
J - -a~ - 1 ~-
ae. (4.5)
As under a contract, realisations of a and~or e different from their expected values
cause an inflatiun surprise and thus a deviation of output from the natural rate. But
cumpared with (3.4) and (3.5), the solutions for inflation and output differ in an
impurtant aspect: the delegatiun parameter, ~rb, has no effect on how a shock to the
central banker's preferences feeds into inflation and output. For example, an increase
in ~rb raises the marginal gain frum inflation both directly, which is captured by the
secund term un the right hand side of (4.2), and indirectly through a proportional
increase in inflation expectations [see (4.3)], which is captured by the first term on
the right hand side uf (4.2). The sum of the weights attached to these two effects is
independent of a and, in fact, equals imity. Hence, actual inflation increases une for
une with the inflation target.
As is clear from (4.4) and (4.5), the choice of the inflation target does not affect the
variance uf inflation and output,9 while the uncertainty arising from the supply shocks
has the same implications for macroeconumic variability as in the case of an inflation
contract. In particular, the transmissiun from supply shocks to target variables is
independent. of the inflation target. Thus,
~z~Qz
oÁ - ~~?!z ~ z~2, (4.6)
(1 -i- a)
1 ~- az
~~ - aa?! } (1 i- a)z~?'
(4.7)
9In Brainard's [1967] terminology, the governmenCs policy instrument does not affect the shape
of the target variables' distribution, as its e(Tc~cts on these variables are certain.
lUand these expressions therefure coincide with (3.6) and (3.7), respectively, if j- 0.
Tu find the uptimal inflatiun target, the guvernment chuuses the value uf ~r~' that
minimises F,[T,"] subject, t.u (4.4) and (4.5). The uptimal inflation target, denuted by
7f6', 1S: ,a~,. - ir - ~j. (4.8)
Substitute ~rb' into (4.4) and (4.5) tu give realised inflation and output under the
uptimal target. Hence, the optimal target implies that:
z z
E [~] - ~' ~,~ - ~"~z f (1 f a)z~"
z
z 2-z 1} aa 2
Qy - ~ay } 11
~- ~)2 ~E ~
~~ - a -1- (1 -h a)Q~,J2 ~ a -F oó ~z (4.9)
2 2(1~-a) `
Nute that t,he optima] inflation target (4.8) dues nut depend on the variances of the
shocks, which fullows immediately from the fact that the infiatiun target dues not
affect the variances uf inflation and uutput. Hence, its optimal value is determined
exclusively by its effects un the means of the target variables. Given that expected
output cannot be affected in this natrrral rate mudel, the inflation target is chosen
snch that the expected inflation rate coincides with the socially optimal inflation rate.
Therefore, as far as the uptimal inflation target is concerned, certainty equivalence
hulds, and, hence, ~rb' currespunds tu the optimal target derived by Svensson [1996]
in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
5. Comparison of the optimal contract with the optimal target
In line with Svensson's [1996] resiilts, it clear from (4.9) with (3.9) that in the absence
uf imcertaint,y about preferences, both the uptimal linear inflation contract and the
uptimal inAatiun target imply the pre-commitment sulution discussed in Sect,iun 2.
Huwever, Lecause in general the optimal inflatiun contract is affected by preference
uncertainty, and the optimal infíation target is nut, it is clear that the means and
variances uf the pulicy targets will differ imder the two delegation arrangements when
óá 1 0.
Comparing (4.9) with (3.9), we see that the variances of inflation and output are
highest imder the uptimal inflation target. This folluws from the fact that, in contrast
tu the inflatiun contract, the inflation target is not able to stabilise (partly) the effects
uf the preference shocks. As noted earlier, such stabilisation in the case of the optimal
cuntract is at the cost, of expected inflation being beluw the socially uptimal inflation
rate. These costs and benefits are the only relevant ones when deciding which form
uf delegatiun is preferred; the effects uf supply shocks on inflation and output are the
same in both cases.
A comparison of the government's expected losses under each form of delegation
[see (3.9) and (4.9)] shows that the optimal inflation contract is superior to the uptimal
11inflatiun target if and unly if:
(lfa)(~}~~) .1 ~f(lfa)arz-z
2(1-Fa-F~á) J ~ 2 J
It, is straightfurward tu verify that this inequality always holds if aa 1 0(note that,
in accordance with the above discussiun, the comparison is independent of a?).'o
Alsu, it is easy tu est.ablish that t.he difference in lusses between the twu delegat.iun
arrangements is increasing in ~~.
Thus, the luwer variability of inflatiun and output under the uptimal inflation
cuntract duminates the welfare loss arísing from average inflation being too low. The
reasun is that t.he deviat.iun of expected inflation frum its target causes only a second-
order welfare luss, whereas the gain in terms uf luwer variability uf inflatiun and output
is of first-urder magnitude. Thus, the superiority of the optimal inflation contract
arises from the fact that, a pusitive value uf f buth stabilises the direct effects of
nncertaint.y abuut the central Lanker's preferences on the target variables and reduces
the average inftatiun bias (althuugh too much). The inflation target, on the other hand,
only eliminates the average inflation bias but dues nut help in reducing the effects of
uncertainty about the central banker's type on output and inflation variability.
6. The optimal combination of a contract and a target
Given that the uptimal linear inflation cuntract and the optimal inflation target yield
different results, one wunders whether there exists a combinatiun of the two arrange-
ments that delivers sfrzctly lower welfare lusses than each of them in isolation. t 1 Below,
we shuw that this is indeed the case.
The timing is as befure and starts with the government choosing the optimal
rombinatiun uf (f,~rb). Then expectations are formed, fullowed by a realisation of the
supply shock. Finall,y, the central banker chouses the inflation rate which minimises
L~B~ rt f(~ - ~),
(6.1)
~uAfter completing thc first draft ofthis papcr, we became aware of Muscatelli [1995] who devotes a
scrtion to Lhe istiue oF inflation targets versus inflation contracLs in a model which is somewhat similar
Lo ours. In line with our findings, his rr3ults suggcsL Lhat a contracL is supcrior Lo a targct. This
cunclusion, howcvcr, is rather speculative in nature, becausc it is bascd un the assumption LhaL thc
optimal delegation arrangements are certainty equivalent (which is in general not thecase). Moroover,
the exprc5sions for the wclfare lusses are, in our opinion, invalid in his paper. This precludes a propcr
welfare cotnpar'vson betwcen a contract and a target.
r~'PL'vs would bc in sharp contrast to Svensson's [1996] rnodel (without unemployment persistence),
where thcrc exists an infinite nutnbcr ofcombinations o( a target and a contract whích all establish the
narne, optirnal cquilibrium. In his modcl, either the LargeL or the contract is redundant in achieving
t.hc optimum.
12subject. to (`l.l), taking inflatiun expectations as given. The first-order condition can be
rewritten tu give the central bank's reactiun, from which we derive expected inflation:
E [~r~ - ~rb f ay - I, (6.2)
If we insert (6.`l) back into the reaction fimction we can ubtain the fullowing expressions
fur realised inHation and uutput,, respectively:
1 l a - c~
(6.3) n-E[~r~-~(J- 1fafl } 1-f~E~
y--n(J- lf~j~ - 1-F-~E~
(64)
I~'ute that these uutcumes are the same as (3.4) and (3.5), respectively, with the unly
difference being that ~rb replaces ~r as a cumpunent of expected inflation. This, however,
has no implicatiuns for the variances uf inHation and output, so that these are still
given by (3.6) and (3.7).
Simultaneuusly minimising L;[l.c'~ with respect to f and ~rb subject to (6.3), (6.4)
and (6.2) yields two first-urder conditions frum which we obtain the uptimal cumbi-
nation of a cunt.ract and a target. We denute this cumbination by (f",~rb'"), where
f" - (1 ~- a) i~, ~n,. - ir ~- y. (6.5)
Substitute these vahies intu (6.3) and (6.4) to give realised inflation and output. The
equilibrium under (6.5) is then characterised by:
[~
2
a2 f aá z s 1}~á 2
E ~r - ~, ~n - (1 -I- a)1~F, ~v -
(1 ~ a)Z~E,
2
L~ - ~~j2 -~ 2(1a~)oE. (6.6)
Cumpared with the uutcumes under a contract or target only, (3.9) and (4.9), re-
spertively, we see frum (6.6) that the optimal combination of a target and a contract
cumpletely eliminates but.h the average inHatiun bias and the stochastic part of infla-
tiun and output which arises from uncertainty abuut the central banker's preferences
unly. The way suppl,y shucks are transmitted tu inHation and output is the same as
Lefure. Therefure, t.he variances uf these variables in (6.6) coincide with the terms
invulving cr? in the rurresponding expressiuns in (3.9) and (4.9).
These resiilts are very intuitive: as is clear frum (6.2), for a given contract the
inHatiun target can always be chusen so as to produce an expected inflation rate which
is equal to the socially optimal rate. Hence, the contract can be chusen freely with
cuncern fur macruecunomic variability only. We saw in Section 3 that f-(1 f a) j
is the contrart whirh minimizes the variances of inflation and output [see also (6.3)
and (6.4)]. Therefure, uptimal delegation involves a contract with j-(1 f~) y and
an inflation target which is then adjusted so as to eliminate the inflation bias.
13Of course, in terms of the expected welfare loss, the optimal delegation combination
(J", ~rb") uutperforms both the arrangement, with a contract only and with a target
unly. Compared to a cuntract unly, variability is reduced and average performance is
improved; cumpared to a target only, variability is reduced. Nevertheless, the arrange-
ment with the optimal delegatiun cumbination is inferior to the pre-commitment so-
httiun. The reason is that, preference tmcertainty affects the transmission frum supply
shucks towards inflatiun and uutput. Therefure, macrueconomic variability is still sub-
uptimally high [compare (6.6) with (2.3)]. The Appendix discusses a contract which
leads the ecunomy to the pre-cummitment. sulution. However, this contract depends on
the realisations of the shucks and may therefore be difficult to implement in practice.
Expressiun (6.5) reveals that the optimal inHatiun target exceeds the sucially opti-
mal inHatiun rate. This is in sharp cuntrast with Svenssun's [1996] possibly unrealistic
finding that the inflatiun target. should be set below the socially optimal rate in order
tu pruvide the munetary authority with the appropriate incentive to eliminate the
inHat.iun Lias (un average). In practice, cuuntries that have adopted an inflation tar-
geting regime du nut, seem tu set t,heir inflation targets Lelow the desired inHatiun rate.
In fact, uur cumUinatiun-delegation arrangement may well represent the most impor-
t.ant. features uf New Zealand's munetary arrangements: an inflatiun target cumbined
with a dismissal rule fur t.he central banker. The additiunal ptutishment imposed by
t.he contract when inHatiun exceeds its uptimal rate could be interpreted as the utility
luss frum dismissal.
7. Is delegation preferable?
Even thuugh the upt.imal delegatiun cumbination (f",~rb") eliminates the inflation
bias, when cumpared with the case uf discretion without delegation, stabilisat.ion of
supply shucks is suboptimal, becaitse the transmission from the shocks to the tar-
get variables is affected by the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences.
Hence, the delegatiun uf munetary polic,y to a central bank which has instrument in-
dependence involves a trade-off between reducing the effects of discretion in monetary
pulicymaking and int.roducing additional variability in output and inflation. Formally,
cumparing (2.4) and (6.6), we find that delegation is preferable if and only if
oQQ~ c a~(1 -F- a)y~.
Delegation is more likel,y to be preferred if the degree uf uncertainty about the central
banker's preferences is luwer, because then the additiunal uncertainty in infiatiun and
uutput arising from imrertain preferences is less. If cr? -~ 0, however, uncertainty
about preferences plays nu rule, and delegation is always preferred. Similarly, if oá -~
0, which yields the standard case considered in the literature, the variance of the
supply shock does nut affect t.he desirability uf delegation. Delegation is alsu more
likely tu be preferable if j or a are higher, because then the incentive, which is futile
in equilibrium, tu raise uutput through tmanticipated inflation is stronger. Therefore,
14the gain frum eliminating the inflation bias is more likely to dominate the loss arising
frum less efficient stabilisation.
This suggests that societies with relatively high macroecunomic variability (high
o?) would be reluctant to hand over the cunduct of monetary policy to an independent
central banker. This rather intuitive predictiun dues not feature in existing models,
where optimal delegation alwn~s impruves upon discretion in the absence of delegation
(and in some cases yields the pre-commitment solution). It is worth stressing that
this result is not due to the fact that, as in the original Rogoff [1985] model, an
independent central bank cunducts insufficient output stabilisation. In our model
the result is due to the risk that stabilisatiun pulicy can deviate in any direction
frum the sucially optimal stabilisatiun policy (that is, output stabilisation may be
subuptimally low or suboptimally high, depending on the realisation of a). As such,
uur results are also in accurdance with the empirical absence of currelation between
~entral bank independence and output variability (see, e.g., Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini [1991]): in uur set-up, countries with independent central bankers will ex
post either shuw tou high ur tuu luw uutput variability compared tu those without.
8. Concluding comments
This paper has discussed the consequences of uncertain central banker preferences
fur the delegatiun of munetary pulicy by means of an inflation contract, an inflation
target, or a cumbination of both. We fotmd that, while delegation helps in reducing
the inflatiun bias from discretion, it alsu leads to inefficient stabilisation, because
the transmission from supply shocks to target. variables becomes uncertain. In terms
uf welfare, the uptimal linear inflatiun cuntract outperforms the uptimal targeting
arrangement. Given that both types of arrangements yield different outcomes when
implemented separately, there exists an uptimal combination ofa target and a contract
which perfurms sl7~ctl~ better than either a contract or a target only. This combination
arrangement eliminates all the vaciability not, associated with economic shocks and has
the empirically appealing property that it involves a target which exceeds the socially
optimal infíatiun rate, thereby resembling existing monetary arrangements.
The chuice to delegate or not involves a trade-uff between eliminating the infla-
tiun bias and less efficient stabilisation. The desirability of delegation increases when
preference uncertainty, the variability of the supply shock, the output target and the
relative weight attached to the output target are all lower.
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Appendix: State-Contingent Contracts
Below we show that the pre-cummitment solution can be attained by offering the
central banker a state-cuntingent linear cuntract, i.e., a contract that depends on
the realisatiuns uf the suppl,y shock and the preference shock. Of course, in practice
such cuntracts are difficult tu implement because t.hey rely un the assumptiun that
it, is possible to sumehuw identify these realisations. In principle, informatiun about
the shocks may be extracted frum realisatiuns uf inflation and output. However, the
extraction prublem is cumplicated by the fact that these realisatiuns depend on the
cuntract itself, which, on its t.iirn, depends un the shocks. Therefore, we assume here
that the shocks can be observed just befure the cuntract is carried out.
17The central banker is uffered a linear cuntract, such that it faces the folluwing loss
fimctiun:
l~~ } (j0 -i' jl~ } f2C f j3lYC) ( Jr - 1r) . (A.1)
Then the fulluwing vectur (jo, j~, J2, f3) uf contract parameters is optimal and ,yields
the pre-commitment sulut,ion:
(tó,ji,jz,js')-(a~~-?I~U,-1). ~ (A.2)
Uptimality is easily established if we cunsider the first-urder condition fur the central
Lank in the absence uf a cuntract, i.e. (jn, ji , f2, !a) - (U, 0, U, 0) :
(a-a)(~r-E[~r]-e-y) ~(lfa)(~r-ir)-0. (A.3)
Huccever, the pre-commitment suhrtiun can be attained if the central bank has the
fulluwing first-urder cundition:
a(n-E[~r]-e)-I (~-T)-U.
Hence, the folluwing marginal luss of inflatiun must be added tu the central bank's
first-urder condition (A.3) in urder to get the apprupriate first-urder conditiun:
n(~r-E[~r] -c-y) ~-aj-n(rr-~r).
Huwever, because E[~r] - ~r in the pre-commitment solution, this reduces tu:
-a (E f j) f ~y.
Hence, t.u ensure the appropriate first-order cunditiun for the central banker requires
a cuntrart. sur,h that
(jo f .Íia f jac -f jaaE) - -a (e f ~) f ~J,
which cuinrides with the combination in (A.2).
Tu verify its optimality, impose the suggested contract and solve fur the central
banker's react.iun function. Taking expectatiuns shows that E[~r] - ~r indeed holds.
Combining this with the reactiun functiun, we obtain the outcomes for inflation and
uutput which indeed coincide with the outcomes for the pre-commitment solution.
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